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JAKOB LEUPOLD’S IMAGINARY
AUTOMATIC ANAMORPHIC DEVICES
OF 1713
Bennett Gilbert
In 1713, the scientiﬁc instrument-maker Jakob Leupold published designs for three machines were
the ﬁrst attempt to design machinery with internal moving parts that replaced human agency in
creating original images. This paper ﬁrst analyzes his text and engravings in order to explain how
he proposed to do this, given contemporary materials and command of physical forces. Next, it
characterizes the devices as a transition from concepts of incision to concepts of mirroring,
taken as models of the history of mechanical reproduction. And ﬁnally, Leupold’s replacement
of the sighting grid with differential gears points to a set of problems appearing in contemporary
philosophy represented in Rococo artistic production of this period as well. Taking the proposed
devices in context, they help to theorize the complex notions of creative activity in Rococo
visual culture. Taken as an episode in the history of communications, they instance the develop-
ment of conceptions of personhood and of physical forces at stake in the invention of automated
media.
KEYWORDS anamorphosis; automation; idealism; media archaeology; mechanical
reproduction; Rococo
I
The ﬁrst published plan for automating the creation of images has hardly been
appreciated even though it was made by the most famous scientiﬁc instrument-maker
of his day, Jakob Leupold (1674–1727). He tried to automate the making of anamorphosed
images. Anamorphosis is the artistic practice of distorting a perspectivally correct image
along consistent geometric lines in such a way that it is not legible except when reﬂected
in a mirror or seen from a vantage point that corrects the distortion by restoring one-point
perspective. Artists used the technique to create single-sheet drawings and engravings or
small canvases, such as, for example, an undated (probably seventeenth- or eighteenth-
century British) playful anamorphic image of Venus1 and a seventeenth-century ‘hidden’
anamorphic portrait of Charles II,2 as well as impressive spectacles such as anamorphed
oil portraits of three saints, each of which is visible alone from a different angle,3 and a
65-foot long fresco St. Francis of Paola at Santa Maria dei Monti in Rome.4 The ‘motor’ of
the devices that Leupold proposed in 1713 to anamorphose images was a pair differential
gears that replaced the grid used by the artists of these and most other earlier perspective-
producing apparatuses. The gears were intended to do the job of the artist, moving her
artistic control and manual operations one step further away from her materials by inter-
posing a mechanism for producing the anamorphed version of a given image.
This mechanism did not immediately present a new vista of cultural production in
multiples as the technologies for reproducing texts and images that ﬂourished from the
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mid-fourteenth century onwards had done, and yet it was not merely one more in the
series of labor-saving mechanical aids for artists. What provokes interest today in Leupold’s
devices, published during a period of sophisticated reﬂection on mechanistic philosophy, is
the fraught position of the artist’s creative power in the face of the mechanization of the
media of human expression. Automation, which seems so helpful and logical, often leaves
people feeling that they are struggling with a threatening and overwhelming force and are
in a situation that requires anxious compromises with the determining force of their
rational machines. Responses to the beneﬁts and losses from automation are part of the
long and difﬁcult connection between persons and objects. Without his intending it, Leu-
pold’s plans suggest some of the anxieties we now see as characteristic of an age of auto-
mation and as central to Western intellectual and political life. At the same time they
portray a checkmate in this conﬂict of a character peculiar to the ﬁrst quarter of the eight-
eenth century. Like other aspects of European culture in the period we now call the Rococo,
Leupold’s inventions suggest a deeply tense balance in the conﬂict of conceptions of per-
sonal agency with the Cartesian and Newtonian concepts of the deterministic, closed, and
mechanically balanced cosmos. In this paper, I will place Leupold’s efforts to invent auto-
mated production of anamorphosed images at the intersection of the histories of media
and of automation in general and in the moral universe of the Rococo.
Historians of visual culture generally begin accounts of anamorphosis at Hans Hol-
bein’s stupendous anamorphed skull in The Ambassadors of 1533, along with references
back to Albrecht Dürer or even to Leonardo, and then drop it after the heyday of artistic
interest in anamorphosis during the time of Gérard Desargues (1591–1661), Emmanuel
Maignan (1601–1676), and Jean François Nicéron (1613–1646). Because anamorphosis ‘pre-
sumably went out of fashion’ by 17005—meaning no longer interesting to scientists and
artists but more widely known as a toy—one is not surprised to ﬁnd that few historians
have discussed Leupold’s devices, nor has anyone considered them as an attempt to
design true automation of image fabrication. The greater part of media archaeology
starts its work at 1740 at the earliest, more often at about 1790. Every one of the accounts
published in the ﬂagship collections and journals that have established disciplinary media
archaeology in the last two decades skips from the end of the seventeenth century up to
pre-Revolutionary or Revolutionary Europe after 1789.6
By and large, media and communications historians rigorously seek thorough-going
materialist, though speculative, accounts of the relations within their subject-matter of
humans to machines and to other objects. Aiming to resolve the agonism between
human and machine, media theorists and historians often rely on some version of
systems or network theory. The most extreme version in the ﬁeld is that of Friedrich
Kittler (1943–2011), followed by Lev Manovich and others, which holds that human con-
sciousness just is the data driven by and drifting in our forms of communication and
that the necessary tendency of the machinic is to take knowledge away from our
control into its own.7 The radical position of Kittler shows the tendency of network
theory in some media archaeology, even under more moderate impulses, to ﬁnd
reasons to deﬂate notions of human autonomy. As an instrument of a materialist and deter-
minist point of view, network theory regards the desire to automate as the self-making
drive of accumulated information, ﬁrst as heaps of words and numbers inscribed on
paper and later as droves of data.
128 BENNETT GILBERT
The network most often, but not always, grows in the manner requiring least friction
and most efﬁciency, although in the long run every failure and mistake remain a part of
every subsequent synchronic state. As a consequence, each bit of sediment is said to be
re-mediated. Sometimes this is called ‘the doubled logic’ of technological innovation; in
truth, it is no different from all other movement of the new from the old in history.
When described as a consequence of network growth, the notion of doubled logic
underlies the insistence by media archaeologists on the presence of past technologies
in the present. However, if every medium re-mediates its predecessor media, at least
one major reason it does so is because the deepest problems of the self that the media
express never are dissolved and never end. The aspect of personhood that viewing our-
selves as nodes in a network or that regarding our consciousness as ﬂuctuations of
voltage puts at stake is not as much an epistemological problem as it is a moral
problem. The side of subjectivity that would be lost under this view is moral agency.
The example of Leupold’s imagined invention, as a chapter in the history of media, will,
as I see it, help to show that network theory does not ﬁnish off the deep problems of per-
sonal will and moral agency. Instead, it drives us to consider how the distress that auto-
mation provokes, especially at the moment of invention, from out of its moving parts,
concerns the moral universe of the operator rather than the ontology of the operator
and machinery. This is one of the ways in which the history of communications can
pursue issues that are both historical and philosophical, as I shall do in probing the impli-
cations of Leupold’s proposed devices.
In examining this issue in Leupold’s tract, I propose also to enrich the binary of
human–machine by a new binary of concepts of human production that intersects it in
the history of reproductive media. This binary comprises the two groups of techniques I
call incision and mirroring. These terms both describe manual operations and also are
metaphors for complex groups of ideas and feelings associated with the technical prac-
tices. Incision includes reproduction by impressing, scratching, or otherwise entering a
copy-image into a substrate, such as paper, metal, and stone. Mirroring includes reproduc-
tion by reﬂection of light without visible mechanical operations in such media as photogra-
phy, cinema, and digitization. Both have a chaîne operatoire by which persons are deeply
entangled with objects and causality, but behind this commonality lies an important group
of differences. Each relies on a different metaphor that might in turn reveal deep notions of
epistemic and moral authority. By applying it to Leupold’s proposed machines, I hope to
develop the scheme of incision andmirroring metaphors as a means for probing these con-
cepts in the history of the storage and diffusion of knowledge.
With regard to the contemporary context of Leupold’s work, the search for person-
hood in Western culture of the ﬁrst quarter of the eighteenth century is not often enough
recognized by scholarship. We will see the issue ﬁrst in terms of the contradictions and ten-
sions in Leupold’s technical plans, then through the schema of incision and mirroring, and
ﬁnally in terms of the broader situation of European thought in the Rococo context.
II.
Leupold published his ideas in Anamorphosis mechanica nova … printed ‘at the
author’s expense’ in Leipzig by Immanuel Tietzen, 1713, a quarto of four unpaginated
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leaves plus three folding engravings.8 The copy of this pamphlet held by the Beinecke
Library, Yale University, which is the copy examined for this study, is bound with Leupold’s
published instrument catalogs of 1720 and 1722 (from the same printer), a manuscript
catalog of instruments for sale by one Michael Deffeld of Ulm,9 plus one other pamphlet
by another author describing an instrument for sale.10 (Among many other interesting
instruments, Leupold advertised a ‘Machina Arithmetica’ in the 1720 catalog11 and a
device for anamorphing images in the 1722 catalog.12) None of these three devices for ana-
morphosis appear in the work on which Leupold’s historical fame is based: his Theatrum
Machinarum (Leipzig, Zunkel, 1724–1735 and 1788) in 11 folio volumes devoted largely
to machines and instruments for hydraulic and liquids engineering—the last of the line
of lavishly illustrated machine books that began in the Renaissance. It was the summa of
a life spent as an inventor, an engineer, a tradesman, and a public ofﬁcial in Leipzig
from 1696 until his death.
Leupold’s text is slender. For each of the three machines it includes (1) a two or three-
line introduction, (2) a descriptive list of its parts, and (3) some practical remarks on its use.
At the end of the pamphlet he mentions some of his published predecessors in a brief bib-
liography and of course repeats the title-page instructions as to how to buy the devices.
The instructions for using his three ‘new’ anamorphic machines are keyed to the three
engravings by the ﬁgure numbers and by letters designating every part. As the title adver-
tises, each machine uses a different means to project an anamorphic image (Figures 1–3)
from a source image, which he calls the ‘prototypon.’ In the ﬁrst machine, he intends the
turning motion of a cylinder to communicate the lines of the source image (of a monkey) to
be communicated to an armature by the turning of a cylinder to which the source image is
attached. In the second, Leupold proposes that the armature turning around a conical core
will incise the source image (of a chicken) in a widened, distorted version at the periphery.
The third device allows the widest variation of results: an operator moves the inscribing
point through a groove in a long wooden rod to a spot on a scale at which the incisor dis-
torts the image (of a maltese cross) to the chosen degree.
FIGURE 1.
Leupold, Anamorphosis Nova (1713), tab. I (mislabeled as ‘III’ and corrected by an early
hand). The James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, Yale University (Osb pc 235)
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All three printed descriptions state a basic mechanical principle and include a pro-
cedure for applying this principle to production. The base principle of all three is this:
the motion that a smaller wheel or gear communicates to a gear of larger diameter by a
rope, through which the former turns the latter, will, guided by the human hand, accurately
distend (that is, anamorph) the prototypon into the desired distorted inscription that the
larger wheel produces. Leupold illustrates the pairs of stacked differential gears by front
views and by cross-sections of their housings. Each system of image creation requires (1)
a receptive point; (2) a communicating relay; and (3) an incising point, or incisor (Spitze)
that punctures or draws the anamorphed pattern into paper.13
Although the differential gears can in theory provide accurately altered images,
Leupold seems to have recognized that the mechanical communication of these distended
FIGURE 2.
Leupold, Anamorphosis Nova (1713), tab. II. The James Marshall and Marie-Louise
Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University (Osb
pc 235)
FIGURE 3.
Leupold, Anamorphosis Nova (1713), tab. III. The James Marshall and Marie-Louise
Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University (Osb
pc 235)
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lines to an incisor is at best imperfect without extensive guidance of the inscribing by the
operator’s eye and hand. And yet the hands he illustrated are small and inert, conveying a
less forceful impression than the detached hands in the plates illustrating the works of
Nicéron and Maignan, much less the complicated bodily labor of the artist whom Dürer
portrays. All three devices require the operator to exert unrelenting pressure on the incis-
ing point, to hold the cylinder steady by downwards pressure, and even to move or turn
the rod with the incising point around the cylinder. But Leupold leaves the problem of
the operator, or technician, to the reader, referring to it in the text solely in vague terms,
while the illustrations lack all representation of effort.14 Furthermore, nowhere in these
plates does Leupold signify vision, either by metaphor or by metonym. The kinked
curling lines representing the operations of vision in Nicéron and Maignan are absent in
Leupold.
For both the labor and eyesight required by the process Leupold has supplied a ﬁxed
point from which both receptor and incisor extend. Tab[ula] III most fully realizes the indis-
pensable job of this point, labeled as ‘n.’ It is disguised as the divided footing of the cylinder
in Tab[ula] 1, labeled ‘g-h,’ whereas in Tab[ula] II it is pivot ‘n’ which has a heavy job of
asserting itself by lifting up footing ‘c-d’ through the contorted connecting plate,
obliged to act as a lever and appropriately labeled ‘x.’ This axis point is necessary to
enable communication of the diameters of the two gears to the two instruments. It
would in fact do so, replacing the artist’s laborious intelligence with a purportedly effortless
or low-effort repetitive motion. This fundament of automated creativity appears on Leu-
pold’s pages about two and a half centuries before Andy Warhol recognized its full
consequences.
Of Leupold’s three proposed machines the ﬁrst is in some ways the most provocative
and intriguing. Like all these designs, it uses a pair of gears to convert vertical motion to
horizontal motion. The plan for data input uses an engraved copper plate that is fastened
by wax to the vertical cylinder that an operator turns. Leupold does not seem to consider
whether curving the plate on the cylinder distorts the ﬂat surface that printing an engrav-
ing requires, or that the engraved image on the plate is reversed from the image the plate
prints. His plan also requires that the incised lines of the plate be deep and clear enough for
the input needle to stay inside the grooves. Leupold of course was intimate with the art of
engraving, but the requisite condition of the lines would obtain only for images pictured by
simple outlines, without hatching, swelling lines, or lighter tones—like the picture of the
cat used as the prototypon for this illustration. Finally, it is hard to imagine a system of con-
nections among the incised lines that could guide the input needle through all the lines
comprising the image if the needle simply bobs along with the rotation of the cylinder.
Here Leupold incorporates, albeit clumsily, the older technology of engraving into his
machine. He uses it in a way that is unprecedented, so far as I know: the engraved plate
remains but not for its conventionally intended function. Its productive element—the
lines the engraver’s tools have incised—are transformed to appear as if in a distorting
lens. In the mid-ﬁfteenth century artists used paste-paper images to make stereotypes
from which copies could be struck, and it is possible that Gutenberg used stereotypes as
well.15 These practices are part of ancient techniques of casting and molding; but
Leupold, abandoning these, seems to rely instead on a notion of mirroring of which he
is not fully aware. This is a consequential distinction to which I will return.
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As this ﬁrst device shows, Leupold envisaged automating the creative act more com-
pletely than anyone else before him whom we know of. Yet he lacked virtually everything
we now know to be necessary for such a machine. By looking at the early successful graphic
registration instruments invented by Étienne-Jules Marey (1830–1904) from 1868 onwards,
we can see the kind of material Leupold did not have in early versions of the forms in which
they were developed and used.16 These include, as Robert M. Brain has pointed out,
materials that mimic organic structures, such as tubing sufﬁciently elastic to carry electrical
impulses from the site of one function to the site of another just as nerves do. Rubber was
unknown in Leupold’s day, but Leupold might have used animal skin for this purpose.
Marey used a diaphragm or tambour to stand in for skin.17 Also, Marey had, but Leupold
did not have, electricity—the force that enables us to copy movement from one
medium and register it in physical or digital documents. Lacking the imaging and transport
capacities of electrical impulses, Leupold is forced to rely on human cognition and volition,
try as hard as he might to suppress or to elide them.
Leupold’s plans required mimicking certain human cognitive and motor functions.
This mimicking characterizes a great deal of automation, especially in the early stages of
a ﬁeld of activity. Leupold had the shell of a notion—a capacious but empty husk—that
bore fruit when ontological and material development later enabled suitable material
invention. In the gap between Leupold’s goal and the means of achieving the goal avail-
able in his workroom we can see that he was imagining part of automation as it was to
come to be. He tried to displace human decision-making and much of the labor that the
exercise of intelligence had hitherto required from the body for this purpose. The hands
that crank the handles and guide the armatures in his illustrations signify this: they are
motors without brains and without bodies. The result inched toward a domain of
copying different from that of casting and molding—a newer domain, present but dimly
and at the horizon. This small advance is the moment in the relationship of personal crea-
tivity and machinic power that Leupold’s work suggests. One further aspect of Leupold’s
work—something absent, something he discarded and did not use rather than something
new that he tried—helps to explain what I call this Rococo moment in the history of
automation.
III.
The particular intended product of Leupold’s machines is an anamorphed represen-
tation that is principally created not by the hand but by parts moving in accord with cal-
culations. Neither hand nor established reproductive techniques (varieties of relief, intaglio,
and etching) fully account for this method of the creation of graphic art, in which it is
machinery that now immediately controls the images. The hand helps, but the possibility
of its not being needed is now presented. The grid is gone, but arithmetic and geometric
structure are more rather than less determinative. The inventor’s abilities are chasing away
the traditional contribution of the artist’s abilities, manufacturing by mechanical means
what hitherto had to be imagined wholly in the mind’s eye. The operator-artist’s hands pic-
tured in the plates have a sort of job to do: a rote job of merely exerting pressure, a job that
is not clearly illustrated but that clearly is on the way to being eliminated. Nonetheless, the
plates suggest the presence of a person attached to the small hands, who appears as the
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creative intelligence of an inventor or a mechanic, such as Leupold himself, whilst the
artist’s tactile knowledge slides down the value scale of labor, demoted to turning knobs
and ‘controlling quality’ in the manufacturing chain. A process here appears that was
new at the time, although parts of it were familiar. The use of old parts in a new way in
fact signals something strange about the process: it is intended to work as if the datum
moves and alters itself, although it could not possibly do so with Leupold’s technology.
Instead of inventing these devices, Leupold could have used Scheiner’s pantograph,
invented in 1603,18 had he wanted simply simultaneously to draw an isomorph; and
there was no type of anamorphosis that the old techniques could not accomplish. The
hand as he portrays it here is unknowingly conceived as a step—small, perhaps, but dis-
tinct—back from its use in previous perspectival devices. Strikingly, it is aided by no die,
mold, burin, or graver. The process Leupold describes is more like mirroring than it is
like incision.
In my research on concepts of the conceptual sources of the reproduction of text and
images in the Occident I have been investigating an hypothesis that two principal streams
of metaphor for human production—those that I referred to above—have informed the
relevant conceptions. The ﬁrst to suggest this binary scheme in print was, so far as I
know, the brilliant medievalist Michel Camille (1958–2002).19 One of these streams is meta-
phors of incision, which includes punching, casting, molding, and all the impress of original
into the material substrate of copy, governed by moral and veridical authority. The other is
mirroring. Reﬂections in the mirror were understood from antiquity through the Middle
Ages to be less material than production by impressed tools and were often associated
with magic. This type of representation is profoundly tied to specularity on the part of a
person, in whom it is mutable more according to subjectivity rather than in accord with
material substrate. The mirror is the metaphor governing the diffusion of digitized data
and images, in which the material touch of original to copy is not incised but is, rather,
‘invisible’ and without visible or tangible substrate. Although electronic processing and
screen displays are in fact material, the events they represent are movements of light
and electricity rather than of mechanical parts.
Now, incision and the mirror do not rigidly exclude one another either as techniques
or as metaphors; and there are domains in which it is likely not possible to separate the
two, such as that of acheiropoietic images. Mirroring is of course no less ancient a trope
than incision, and the two metaphors frequently mingle. For example, Brunelleschi uses
it as device and as concept right at the beginning of the early modern history of perspec-
tive.20 Leupold, too, mixes incision and mirroring when he shows that his apparatuses can
punch a stencil to be used for pouncing, the process by which an artist forces a powder
through stipple-produced holes conﬁguring a design so as to provide a pattern on
another surface. The long-term switch from incision to mirroring is merely incipient at
this date.
Using this framework, we can say that Leupold’s proposed production techniques
were small, early, partial, and unconscious technological steps toward the increasing
force of the mirror model of the artefaction of text and images relative to the incision
model in Western representation, both prototypical and reproductive. The means by
which Leupold arranges relaying the image to the incisor is more like that of a mirror
manqué than anything at all in the ancient lineage of casting techniques. Leupold does
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in fact prescribe the assistance of a mirror for his third device—the conical apparatus—and
for the third one only;21 but, again, the point is not so much the technology as the trends in
the conception or metaphor informing production even when the latter does not fully
realize the former. Leupold’s anamorphic machinery envisions, just a very little bit more
than its predecessors yet to a degree sufﬁcient to command our attention, the creation
of images by incision, and yet in the same stroke it requires some transfer without incision
that is akin to the reﬂection in a mirror—in this case, a distorting mirror. Because their
inventor did not have the technology for true non-incising production, the human hand
must intervene so as to press the incisor down on the paper, as if incision were now
only barely necessary, nearly done away with; and in the ﬁrst device the most prominent
incision technique of its day—engraving—is re-mediated, dis-empowered, and re-posi-
tioned to serve a wholly other conception.
Photography was at last to realize this conception more fully about a century later by
making actual the transfer of light, as if in a mirror, and then ﬁxing the light image. It was
photography that freed the subject’s range of perception into new, now familiar, forms.
There were more tinkerers (stretching back into the eighteenth century) experimenting
with proto-photographic techniques than there were canonical inventors, and we can
class Leupold among the earliest of them.22 This context should also include the history
of the automated graphic registration of information, the study of which has hardly com-
menced.23 Earlier graphic registration devices include Anselm de Boodt’s 1609 use of a
hodometer with a compass to punch holes in a strip of paper; and Christopher Wren’s
and Robert Hooke’s unpublished weather clock of around 1663, which recorded atmos-
pheric temperature changes.
In the third volume of his Theatrum Machinarum (1724) Leupold describes a universal
meteorological recorder, called the plagiscope that is intended to inscribe measurements
made by thermometers, barometer, and hyetometers (rain-gauges).24 In his anamorphic
devices Leupold tracks the same goal, attempting to convert a circular motion that
copies the traces of rectilinear motion into new and altered rectilinear form. Raindrops
or heart-beats are so different from graphics that once they are measured the engineer
needs only to convert one way of measurement of motion into another. But the anamor-
phosed image is the same sort of thing that the source image is: it has no intermediate
form except that which is in the mind of the operator. The ﬁneness of this mental inter-
mediary requires greater control of operation than Leupold’s materials allowed him.
It seems that Leupold attempted to transfer light, but of course this effort was fru-
strated because he had to contend with friction. Besides lacking an energy source other
than human input, his insensitive materials cannot overcome the friction of registration
points on the surfaces of either source or product. Leupold describes some of his attempts
to control friction with rigid guides for rollers as well as other devices in volume one of the
Theatrum Machinarum (1724).25 The successful way around friction in fact is, however, not
by mechanical force but by electrical power and chemical processes, the true principles of
which Leupold could not have known in 1713. Again, the failure of machinery brings unrea-
lized conceptions to light. The ideas out of which the failed device was constructed show
that at Leupold’s moment the mirror metaphor of the reproduction of images, which used
light rather than mechanical inscribing operations, could express the power of human
agency and at the same time promise its substitution by automation.
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IV.
One part of Leupold’s thinking by which he devised these inventions was his idea of
dispensing with the sighting grid (netz) used in much of the prior history of perspectival
devices. From the time of Dürer’s famous ﬁrst illustration of a device for drawing perspec-
tive in 1525, most such devices illustrated in print or in manuscripts rely on a lattice or grid
through which the artist looks or through which light is projected.26 From Alberti and Bru-
nelleschi through Nicéron and Maignan, the grid is an important tool for monopunctual
perspective, including anamorphosis. It expresses a notion of rationality belonging to per-
spectival conception and artefaction. Without it the artist’s eye lacks a capable tool for the
task of drawing in perspective. Also, Dürer, Maignan, and Nicéron all suggested the use of
the grid in anamorphosing an image, which they considered a function derived from ren-
dering an image in proper perspective. One reason to remove the grid is to replace it with a
mechanism that does what the artist and the grid do together. To this end Leupold’s gears
are lashed to one another; but, huddling with their pivots, they almost fully exclude the
artist, pushing her outside the brass and wood housings within which they spin. They
point to mechanisms not yet invented in 1713 based upon forces not employed in full
until more than a hundred years later. They point to a spot to be ﬁlled in and in this
way are a straggling early thread of the changes in vision and perspective away from
their Renaissance forms into the new forms to be associated with the technical and artistic
developments of the nineteenth century.
The closest predecessor is the machine proposed by the inﬂuential teacher Ludovico
Cardi di Cigoli (1559–1613) in a manuscript of c. 1610–1613 that though never published
was well circulated in copies.27 Nicéron describes Cigoli’s device as a ‘machine catholique’
or ‘universel.’28 But for Cigoli an image in perspective was correct and true. Although his
machine could produce an anamorph, he seems not to have been interested in making
a ‘ﬁgure defformé et confusé en aparence,’ in Nicéron’s words.29 Whatever the capabilities
of Cigoli’s apparatus were, Leupold’s proposed machines, besides being the ﬁrst such
devices in print, aim, as Cigoli’s machine did not, to automate the alteration of an image.
Leupold’s plan for a uniﬁed automated act rearranged input information in the
process of registration on a document. To the extent that the artistic person was as
much dominated by the grid as she was dominating nature, Leupold, perhaps like other
inventors of automata, seems to have wished, if unconsciously, to free the agent by provid-
ing her with a means of more powerful domination of the ﬁeld of vision, of production, and
of personal expression. His removing the grid from the production of ‘deformirte Bild’30
separates anamorphosis from monopunctual perspective and moves the intelligibility of
the information out of control of the spectator, who needs another device (such as a cylind-
rical mirror) or a key (e.g., the location at which she can return the image to its public, or
intuitive, or original form). The ghost of the person in Leupold’s plans—the artist partially
disembodied in anticipation of a causal agent both freer and more efﬁcient but that was
not yet within the inventor’s technical capability—is part of what grew to be an important
conﬂict in later modernity: the conﬂict between subjectivity and documentality.31
In 1713 Leupold, as Gutenberg and his immediate followers among letterpress and
engraving printers in the mid-ﬁfteenth century had done through their laborious develop-
ment of the screw-press and the roller-press out of predecessor machines, interposed an
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energy-transferring machine between the person and the document.32 Because the tech-
nology of printing was largely stable from about 1465 (with the adoption of the roller-press
for engravings) until the early nineteenth century, no innovation in the graphic creation,
storage, or diffusion of information between Gutenberg and Leupold accomplished this
transformation in a new way—for example, not the ﬁrst text indices in the 1480s, not
increased production and management of printed texts in the 1490s, not clariﬁed typo-
graphic layouts in the 1530s, nor the widespread use of engravings in book illustration
(richer in information than woodcuts) in the 1550s, nor incremental improvements in
press and paper and style. These and other tools that enlarged the epistemic base
lodged in texts seem to have increased hermeneutic and humanistic subjectivity,
tending toward the surer hold of a person on ideas and words, rather than to have threa-
tened it. In Foucault’s terms they increased the will to knowledge that constitutes subjec-
tivity. In the resuscitation of the anamorphic image as a toy, as in all the optical games and
instructional techniques of the eighteenth century, both the emergence of powerful
empirical technology was forecast and deep fears of the power of documents to control
and to distort life in the world were elided, diverted, perhaps paciﬁed for a while.33 In Leu-
pold’s failed machine, partly because it combines anamorphosis with automation, we can
see one early, hazy, distant sprout of the phantasmagoria of the individual and mass
society in the next and succeeding centuries.
V.
By removing the grid from his devices Leupold moved the link between the way in
which the mind creates and the way in which machines produce in a direction that is, in
part, turned away from mechanistic causality as it was commonly understood around
1713. Unawares, he straggled toward seeking a source of action in the image itself
rather than in tangible causes. His plans imply that direct use of the tool does not probe
or reveal the inner content of the image so well as the use of tools to make other tools
does. These other tools then probe further than our hands or eyes; they can do something
that seems magical to people who look at the matter from within a mechanistic view of the
universe. Inside of the objects we create—which is to say, inside ourselves, in our moral
universe—lies another structure that looks strange to us, leading to a different level of
experience.
His anamorphosing and automating attempts, taken together, adjust the relations of
subject and object in response to the conﬂict their separation posed in contemporary
thought. A brief and rough account of this conﬂict begins with Gottfried W. F. Leibniz
(1646–1716). Leibniz, responding to problems in Descartes’s metaphysics, Netwonian
mechanics, and the Western logical tradition, saw the cosmos as a dynamic but perfectly
calibrated inﬁnity of interlocking operations inseparable from its creator. Dissatisﬁed with
the elaborate typology of causalities that Leibniz’s conception required, Bishop George Ber-
keley (1685–1753) radically reduced all natural forces, powers, and qualities to the will of
God—cutting to the chase, as it were, past Leibniz’s architectonic. Berkeley argued that
we misunderstand the apparent mechanism of causality if we take it to be a contingent
structure so vast and intricate that it presents us with the possibility of our non-existence,
or even terrorizes us with annihilation; it is, instead, a divine plan that we, in our ﬁnitude
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and simplicity, read as physical causality. Its real substance, he holds, is not material; its real
power, not the causality belonging to matter but the creativity belonging to spiritual
beings. In the same decades, from about 1710 to the 1740s, Giambattista Vico (1668–
1744) expanded a notion of our mental reﬂection to an amplitude at which it is adequate
to history and must be understood as a force distinct from nature itself and thereby not
subject to the overwhelming power of a mechanical cosmos.
Viewed in the framework of the ﬁrst quarter or third of the eighteenth century, the
notions of non-material and non-natural causal force that Berkeley and Vico employ—
divine creation for Berkeley and the stuff of human intelligence operating in the world
for Vico—parallel a ground that was very fully expressed in the plastic arts of the
Rococo. The highpoint decades of Rococo style ran from about 1700 to about 1740, follow-
ing the high tide of the preceding Baroque period and prior to the subsequent technologi-
cal regime of the Encyclopèdie and the rationalist regime of neo-Classicism that from about
1740 onwards. Starting in about 1690–1700 craftsmen, artists, and architects began to alter
Baroque style. Rococo style then ﬂooded into Western arts and design—into the pro-
duction of paintings, interiors, furniture, buildings, and beautiful objects of all kinds and
through music and literature in varying degrees—in the subsequent decades, ﬂourishing
and then fading in different parts of Europe and the Americas until it submerged
beneath a highly rationalistic and materialist classicism, led by Denis Diderot (1713–
1784), that vigorously attacked it on strong philosophical and moral grounds.
Partly as a result of Diderot’s critique, art historians conventionally have seen the
Rococo as a variation of the favored phenomena of the Baroque; its deﬁnition, extent,
and qualities are greatly disputed.34 More recent scholarship supports a different view.
As a particular form of the idea that the human is uniquely endowed with creative poten-
tial, it burst past the towering hierarchies of Baroque vision and put the focus on atectonic
visual effects that appear to ﬂaunt the laws of natural mechanism in favor of free human
creative expression. The enormity of the universe, the vastness of knowledge, and the
terrors and comforts in nature—in short, the sublime of the eighteenth century—put
the focus on what being a human person means in these circumstances. In an untheorized
way Rococo style addressed this by attention to the situation of persons as creators. Leu-
polds’s attempted automation of anamorphosis moves anamorphosis from a Baroque
marvel into the contest of a Rococo compromise about human agency amidst a mechan-
ical universe.
It is his rejection of the grid, or lattice, that links Leupold’s mechanical imagination to
Rococo style, and it also connects philosophical and art historical concepts to issues in
automation. Of all the great motifs of Rococo decor—the shell, the mirror, the S-curve,
and the C-curve, the pairing of white and gold, the palm tree, the rafﬂe-leaf, the grotto,
rocaille itself—the one least commented upon by scholars is one of the most frequent:
the lattice.35 On walls and vaults, in wood and bronze, dominating palace, cathedral,
and bibelot, Rococo architects and artisans—especially the stuccadors (stucco-workers)
who created the surface decoration that architects wanted—squeezed, clipped, and
twisted the grid. It was subjected to the demands of perception and of taste instead of sub-
jecting perception and taste to its structuring of homogeneous and abstract space. In these
deluxe objects and buildings the designers seemed to use their distorted latticework orna-
ments to attack and to subvert the control of nature by rational mechanics. In some parts of
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the consciousness of Western early modernity in the ﬁrst quarter of the eighteenth century
the beneﬁts and the dangers that a mechanistic, reductive, and bureaucratic episteme rep-
resented by the powerful contribution of the grid to thought—from Descartes’ X–Y graphs
toward the quantiﬁcation and formalization of empirical knowledge—was subjected to
active discursive debate and implicit artistic critique.
The apparatus devised by Cigoli and Scheiner had substantial renown and inﬂuence,
whereas Leupold’s pamphlet had little. Yet Leupold’s machinery for anamorphosis is an
example of the difﬁculties—growing in part from the pressures of mechanistic philos-
ophy—within the Western conception of subjectivity at the end of the Baroque impulse.
His removal of the grid reﬂects a critique, also expressed by the anamorphosis of the
grid in the plastic arts of his day, of the mechanical world-system administered by
single-point rational perspective. If anamorphosis had always been a critique of systema-
tized knowledge, then Leupold’s invention goes a step further: it shows us a mechanical
engineer beginning to inquire into a different view of nature, in which both physical
forces and human subjectivity were to be reconceived.36 Art historian Bret Rothstein
points out that the artistic practice of anamorphosis ‘probe[s] the contingency of human
understanding.’37 In the early modern period it squeezed something suppressed and
something new as well out of images that, along with many other developments over
the course of time, put representation into question. This reﬂected issues not only of
what the machine does but also of what persons do. Leupold’s steps toward turning an
artist into an operator of machines suggest some of the anxiety about human personhood
inside the drive toward automation.38 As if in a negative image, the missing efﬁcient cause
in his plans shadows questions of personhood and identity that rise when we contend with
nature and when the knowledge gained in that contest develops into forms of registration
and classiﬁcation that we both resist and desire.
As a general principle of media history, the understanding of the human person that
we gain through human and machinic forces is more important than the development of
our technology. If the power of inscription has no foundation other than its interaction
with material nature, its potential to re-order personal action and knowledge by regis-
tration can be calamitous. When we look closely enough to understand Leupold to be
—just barely visibly—on the ﬁne ledge of a domain in which machines create, or seem
to do so, and while watching him withdraw mind, eye, and hand, even in very small
measures, we can and must see, along with the gains, the distress that the losses
cause. In Leupold’s world and at his moment such fear of calamity, taking a large political
form as state absolutism, was conceptualized as a crisis of knowledge by which our place
in a world of mechanical causality and our extinction as moral agents were separated
solely by a perilously thinning ﬁlm of subjectivity. In the Rococo moment in the ﬁrst
decades of the eighteenth century this dark fear could be wished away in optimism,
sensual joy, bounteous production, and the free development of forms. Leupold,
neither natural philosopher nor artist but an engineer looking at the possibilities of
machine power for image production, arrived at a situation of contradiction or, as I put
it at the beginning of this paper, an uneasy stasis. Here in this small moral universe,
even in the beginnings automated media, and particularly automated documentation,
lay the conﬂict over the nature of human personhood.
JAKOB LEUPOLD’S IMAGINARY AUTOMATIC ANAMORPHIC DEVICES 139
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Prof. Thomas Luckett of Portland State University for his generous help in
Rococo studies, to Damien Jack for editorial assistance, and to an anonymous reader for many
valuable insights.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Unsigned, at the West Highland Museum, Fort William, UK. It can be seen both as a canvas
and reﬂected in a cylinder at: http://artuk.org/discover/artworks/anamorphic-venus-
167682/search/keyword:anamorphic/view_as/grid/page/1.
2. Unsigned, at Tapley House, Devonshire, UK. The canvas can be seen at http://artuk.org/
discover/artworks/an-anamorphic-portrait-of-charles-ii-103812/search/keyword:
anamorphic/view_as/grid/page/1
3. Undated, sixteenth to seventeenth century, in the Wellcome Library. All three views can be
seen at http://artuk.org/discover/artworks/saint-francis-of-assisi-saint-francis-de-paul-and-
saint-peter-penitent-126268/search/keyword:anamorphic/view_as/grid/page/1.
4. Unsigned, eighteenth century, fully displayed in a short ﬁlm from the National Gallery (UK)
on Youtube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aGWQOzH0JY A short ﬁlm explaining
early anamorphic techniques, with illustrations from contemporary manuals and examples
made in 1991 by the Brothers Quay can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
4EfSmGSrF3w
5. Andersen, The Geometry of an Art, 611.
6. These papers include, among others: Couchot, “The Automatization of Figurative Tech-
nique,” 181–92; Gitelman, “Introduction,” xi–xxi; Manovich, “The Automation of Sight,”
229–45; Tomas, Beyond the Image Machine, 11–40; and Zielinski’s various works, notably
Deep Time of the Media and “Modeling Media.”
7. Parikka, What is Media Archaeology, 63. Kittler, in his Optical Media, 29–30, holds that we
ought to think about our bodies, and therefore our experience and our selves, in terms
of technological media and information rather than think of the media in terms of our
sense of human personhood.
8. Jacob Leupolds, Mechanici zu Leipzig, Anamorphosis mechanica nova, oder, Beschreibung
dreyer neuen Machinen: mit welchen sehr geschwinde und leichte, auch von denjenigen, so
solcher Wissenschafft unerfahren, mancherley Bilder und Figuren können gezeichnet werden,
dass sie gantz ungestalt und unkäntlich fallen, dennoch aber die ersten durch einen Cylander-
die andern durch einen Conischen- und die dritten mit einen ﬂachen Spiegel oder gewissen
Augen-Punct wiederum in rechter Gestalt und Proportion erscheinen, mit vielen deutlichen
Figuren entworffen: auf Kosten des Autoris, bey welchen es im Nosocomio vorm Ranstädter-
Thore wie auch im kleinen Fürsten-Collegio bey C. Zunckeln zu bekommen. There are two
recorded US copies: the Beinecke copy and a copy at the Adler Planetarium in Chicago
(plus a photocopy of the Beinecke copy at the Getty Research Institute. The Adler copy is
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bound with the three parts of Leupold’s Antilla pneumatica (1707, 1712), his 1718 illustrated
machine catalogue, plus seven philosophical dissertations and two scientiﬁc dissertations
from 1743 to 1752. There are also six copies in Germany, two in Great Britain, and one in
Denmark.Plate (‘Tab[ula]’) I (mislabeling as plate III corrected in an early hand) is signed
by Leupold as the draftsman (‘Inventor delineavit’) and by E. Andresohn of Leipzig as the
engraver; plates II and III are signed by Leupold (‘Autor fecit’).Early references to this
work include a preview, titled ‘Machina anamorphotica ad deformandas imagines, a
speculo cylindrico reformandas,’ in the Acta Eruditorum for 1712, ed. Otto Meincke
(Leipzig, Günther for Gross and Gleiditsch), 273 and the plate on 367; a detailed description
by Alexandre Savérien, Dictionnaire universel de mathématique et de physique (Paris, Rollin
and Jombert, 1753), 1.23–24 and plate 38, ﬁg.s 265–268; and a brief description in
Mathurin-Jacques Brisson, Dictionnaire raisonné de physique (Paris, hôtel de Thou, 1781),
1.92 (citing Savérien and wrongly giving the date as 1714).Modern references to this
pamphlet include Andersen, “Geometry,” 611–2; Baltrušaitis, Anamorphic Art, 155–7, ﬁg.
122; Rink, “Jakob Leupold and his Theatrum Machinarum,” 128, no. 2; and Stafford and
Terpak, Devices of Wonder, 245, ﬁg. 84, and exhibit catalogue entry no. 164 (Beinecke copy).-
Rink, ‘Leupold,’ includes a complete bibliography of Leupold’s publications. Troitzsch, “Zum
Stande der Forschung über Jakob Leupold,” 263–86, is a comprehensive study of the early
and modern literature to its date on Leupold.
9. I have found nothing on Deffeld, who describes himself as ‘Mathematophilis.’ I presume the
manuscript is holographic. It lists instruments with prices, and it includes a drawing of the
differential gears used in one of the anamorphic machines in a housing, directly copied from
the engraved ﬁgure. As it is on a tipped-in piece of paper cut to size, larger than the leaf of
the manuscript, and gently folded at the top to ﬁt, the writer went to some trouble to
include it.
10. Beinecke Library, Yale University, Osborn pc235.
11. f. 2r.
12. This is item 1under ‘Neue Optische Sachen’ on f. 1v, priced at 2 thalers, 6 groschen,
described as using a cylindrical mirror and therefore probably is identical with the ﬁrst
machine described in Anamorphosis mechanica nova.
13. Tomas, Beyond, 180–5, following an idea from Gregory Bateson, is one of the few media his-
torians to focus on the signiﬁcance of the point of inscription.
14. ff. 2v-3r, 3v, and 4r.
15. The most comprehensive current survey is Fleischmann, Metallschnitt und Teigdruck;
however newer scientiﬁc studies are under way although as yet unpublished. The issue
of Gutenberg’s possible stereotyping has been raised by the discoveries of Paul
Needham and Blaise Augüera y Arcas, for which see Augüera y Arcas, “Temporary Matrices
and Elemental Punches in Gutenberg’s DK Type.”
16. For Marey see Braun, Picturing Time: the work of Etienne-Jules Marey and also the short but
incisive discussion by Daston, “Scientiﬁc Objectivity with and without Words,” 276–9.
17. One element Marey and Leupold had in common is that they both used paper as the
memory substrate for the registered result. See Brain, “Representation of the Line.”
18. Invented by Christoph Scheiner (1573–1650) and ﬁrst published in his Pantographice seu ars
delineandi (Rome: Grignani, 1631).
19. Camille, “Before the Gaze,” 209–11.
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20. Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, 61ff. See also Carman, Leon Battista Alberti and Nicholas
Cusanus, 122–9 and 137–40.
21. f. 4r.
22. Leupold’s inventions ﬁt well as a dim pre-ﬁguring of the developments later in the eight-
eenth century described by Batchen in his superb account of proto-photography, Burning
with Desire, 106ff.
23. Hoff and Geddes, “The Beginnings of Graphic Recording,” seems to be the only general
account of this subject yet published; Braun, Marey, 389 n. 42, gives a list of other papers
that Hoff and Geddes wrote together on particular topics and events in the history of
this kind of technology. Little has been done in this area since their work.
24. Hoff and Geddes, “Beginnings,” 304–9 and ﬁg.s 15–16, noting that it does not appear that
Leupold successfully made this mechanism.
25. Section 238 as cited in Lockett, “Friction According to Jakob Leupold,” 55–7. Volume one of
Leupold’s work is titled Theatrum Machinarum Generale.
26. Like the grid system for maps attributed to Ptolemy, the artist’s grid—which was perhaps
taken from the mapping grid—was a way to make space into uniform modules from
which copies of images could be built. See Edgerton, The Renaissance Discovery of Linear
Perspective, 111–23.
27. On Cigoli see Chappell, “Cigoli’s Prospettiva pratica,” 105–25 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997); Kemp, The Science of Art, 177–80; and Massey, Picturing Space, Displacing
Bodies, 92–3.
28. Jean François Nicéron, La Perspective Curieuse (Paris, Billain, 1637; Langlois, 1652; and Du
Puis, 1663), 130–3 (R1v-R3r) and tab. 37 ﬁg. LXXIV and tab. 38 ﬁg LXXV. The imposition is
the same in all three editions.
29. Nicéron, La Perspective , 100 (N2v).
30. f. 3v.
31. Registration of identity, as Groebner, Who Are You? has shown, is associated with docu-
ments in early modern society.
32. A scribe’s pen of course transfers energy, but it has no mechanism intervening between
muscles and the inscriptor point.
33. See Stafford, Artful Science, 105. Stafford also discusses a text by Leupold on sign language
(204–9).
34. On the question of the distinction between Baroque and Rococo, see my thesis, Some Neg-
lected Aspects of the Rococo: Berkeley, Vico, and Rococo Style, 66–95
35. My claim that scholarship of Rococo style does not adequately treat the lattice or grid motif
is based on study of the major catalogues of Rococo objects and books on Rococo architec-
ture, too numerous to mention here, and on my reading of the theoretical literature on the
Rococo. The works from this latter category that have most informed my observations
include Bauer, Rocaille; Harries, The Bavarian Rococo Church; Minguet, Esthétique du
rococo; and Weisgerber, Le Rococo Beaux-Arts et litterature.
36. For a view of anamorphosis as such a subversion or critique throughout its earlier history,
see Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 90–6.
37. Rothstein, “Making Trouble,” 119.
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38. Much of the recent literature on anamorphosis connects it to psychic drives and desires,
based on Jacques Lacan’s analysis of Holbein’s anamorphosed skull. The source text is
Lacan, Seminar XI.
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